Enhancing sentences in the absence of a prosecution appeal by LAU, Kwan Ho
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
7-2014
Enhancing sentences in the absence of a
prosecution appeal
Kwan Ho LAU
Singapore Management University, kwanholau@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LAU, Kwan Ho. Enhancing sentences in the absence of a prosecution appeal. (2014). Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. 229-237.
Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2878
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies
[2014] 229–237
ENHANCING SENTENCES IN THE ABSENCE
OF A PROSECUTION APPEAL
Criminal Procedure Code1
Lau Kwan Ho*
Sometimes, following a conviction, an appeal is brought by the convicted person without any cross-
appeal by the Prosecution on the sentence. Can the appellate court nevertheless increase the sentence
imposed below? This study of the relevant cases and statutory provisions in Singapore suggests that
both the High Court and the Court of Appeal are vested with the power to increase the sentence even
where the only appeal is brought by the convicted person.
I. Introduction
A convicted person may choose to appeal his conviction, his sentence or both. There
is an exception to this general rule: a person who has pleaded guilty may appeal only
against his sentence.2 But apart from this it is his right and entitlement to take the trial
judge’s decision to a higher court.3 Likewise, the Prosecution may appeal against the
acquittal of the accused person (if he is acquitted) or the sentence imposed on him (if
he is convicted). In reality, however, a person found guilty at trial not infrequently
discovers that he is the only one who has filed an appeal. The Prosecution has decided
not to appeal against the sentence imposed. Can the appellate court in such a case
enhance the sentence, notwithstanding that the Prosecution has not asked for it to be
increased?
II. The Legislative Landscape
Before 2010, it was necessary to differentiate between appeals in the High Court
and appeals in the Court of Appeal. In the case of the latter, if the Court of Appeal
thought that a different sentence should have been passed, it could quash the sentence
below and pass such other sentence warranted in law (whether more or less severe)
in substitution therefor, pursuant to s. 54(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.4
This pellucid language arguably permitted the passing of an enhanced sentence even
∗ LL.B., National University of Singapore; LL.M., New York University.
1 Cap. 68, 2012 Rev. Ed. Sing. [2012 CPC].
2 Ibid., s. 375.
3 See e.g., Leong Mun Kwai v. Public Prosecutor [1971-1973] S.L.R.(R.) 707 at para. 2 (H.C.).
4 Cap. 322, 2007 Rev. Ed. Sing. [SCJA].
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where the only appeal brought was by the convicted person. That is the position
taken in Malaysia, which has a provision similar to s. 54(4),5 and also previously in
England when the equivalent legislation was in force there.6
The power of the High Court to interfere with sentence, on the other hand, was
found in s. 256 of the 1985 Criminal Procedure Code,7 under which the court could,
in an appeal against conviction or sentence, reduce or enhance or alter the nature
of the sentence. It had previously been explained that this section, read with s. 268
of the same Code, conferred on the High Court a power under its revisionary juris-
diction which enabled it to increase a sentence even in the absence of an appeal by
the Prosecution. In Navaseelan Balasingam v. Public Prosecutor,8 the convicted
person had appealed against the manifest excessiveness of his sentence. Tay Yong
Kwang J. disagreed. He thought that the sentence was manifestly inadequate, and
was inclined to enhance it. After examining the law, Tay J. concluded that whilst
the Prosecution had not appealed against the sentence imposed, he was entitled to
exercise his powers of revision to modify the permutation of the consecutive prison
sentences, which resulted in an overall increase of two years’ imprisonment.9
Prior to 2010, therefore, it was clear that both the High Court and the Court of
Appeal possessed the power to enhance a sentence even in the absence of an appeal by
the Prosecution. Crucially, however, the Court of Appeal was permitted to increase
a sentence pursuant to its appellate powers under s. 54(4) of the SCJA, while it was
said that the High Court was exercising its revisionary powers when it enhanced a
sentence.
Significant amendments in 2010 resulted in the repeal of s. 54(4) of the SCJA and
the re-enactment of the Criminal Procedure Code.10 The powers of an appellate
court, be it the High Court or the Court of Appeal, have now been consolidated in
a single provision, s. 390 of the 2012 CPC.11 Under s. 390(1)(b) the court may, in
an appeal from a conviction, reduce or enhance or alter the nature of the sentence.
These powers are also available in an appeal as to the sentence.12 All this has to be
read in conjunction with s. 394, pursuant to which the appellate court may set aside
a sentence only if it is wrong in law, against the weight of evidence, or manifestly
excessive or inadequate in all the circumstances of the case.13
5 Rosli bin Supardi v. Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 M.L.J. 256 at 262 (C.A.); Azmi bin Harun v. Public
Prosecutor [2006] 5 M.L.J. 353 at para. 7 (C.A.); Kesavan a/l Baskaran v. Public Prosecutor [2008] 6
M.L.J. 384 at paras. 12, 13 (C.A.). For similar comments in Australia, see e.g., R H McL v. The Queen
(2000) 203 C.L.R. 452 at para. 82 (H.C.A.); Arnaout v. The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 278 at para. 15. See
also R. v. Hill [1977] 1 S.C.R. 827 for a Canadian take on a differently worded provision, and HKSAR
v. Tong Fuk Sing [1999] 3 H.K.C. 332 in Hong Kong.
6 Lord Goddard, “The Working of the Court of Criminal Appeal” (1952-1954) 2 Journal of the Society of
Public Teachers of Law, New Series 1 at 2. The English provision was s. 4(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act,
1907 (U.K.), 7 Edw. VII, c. 23, upon which Singapore enacted s. 6(3) of the Court of Criminal Appeal
Ordinance 1931 (S.S.) (No. 5 of 1931).
7 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [1985 CPC].
8 [2007] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 767 (H.C.) [Navaseelan].
9 Ibid. at paras. 29-32. See also Ho Kin Luan v. Public Prosecutor (1959) 25 M.L.J. 159 at 161
(C.A.); Jamalludin B Khadiron v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 7 M.L.J. 280 at para. 17 (H.C.).
10 Both changes were effected by the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (No. 15 of 2010, Sing.).
11 2012 CPC, supra note 1.
12 Ibid., s. 390(1)(c).
13 Public Prosecutor v. Lee Meow Sim Jenny [1993] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 369 at para. 12 (C.A.).
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III. Does Section 390 of the 2012 CPC Permit an Appellate
Court to Enhance a Sentence Even in the Absence
of a Prosecution Appeal?
Three permutations exist in a case where the Prosecution has not appealed: the con-
victed person appeals his conviction, his sentence, or his conviction and sentence.
It is convenient to discuss the first two scenarios separately, following which the
third should fall into place. In an appeal against conviction the court may, under
s. 390(1)(b)(ii) of the 2012 CPC, reduce or enhance the sentence passed below.14
There is no ambiguity here; the court can increase the sentence notwithstanding that
the Prosecution has not also filed an appeal.15 The history of the provision con-
firms this. Its predecessor, s. 310(b)(ii) of the 1936 Criminal Procedure Code,16
was amended precisely to allow the court to enhance a sentence in an appeal from
a conviction. Section 310(b)(ii) in its earliest forms—that is, s. 302(d)(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Code 1900,17 and later s. 303(d)(2) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code 191018—stated that in an appeal from a conviction the court could, in
respect of sentence, only reduce it.19 The words “or enhance” were deliberately
introduced via an amendment in 1933,20 the reason being that this was “based on
the corresponding law in the Federated Malay States”.21 This appears to be a ref-
erence to s. 314(b)(ii) of the Federated Malay States’ Criminal Procedure Code
1926.22
The second scenario is where the convicted person has appealed his sentence only.
Section 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC is the applicable provision here, and it states that
the appellate court may, “in an appeal as to sentence, reduce or enhance the sentence,
or alter the nature of the sentence”.23 A casual reading might suggest that the court
can reduce or enhance the sentence in any appeal as to sentence, regardless of whether
it was brought by the Prosecution or the Defence. But the position is not that clear.
Section 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC is undoubtedly a reproduction of s. 256(c) of the
1985 CPC, which, as mentioned earlier, applied only to appeals in the High Court.
14 2012 CPC, supra note 1, s. 390(1)(b)(ii).
15 Lin Bin v. Public Prosecutor [2005] SGHC 213 at para. 57. The court there increased the sentence
pursuant to s. 256(b)(ii) of the 1985 CPC, the predecessor to s. 390(1)(b)(ii) of the 2012 CPC. See also
Lim Chow Keng v. Public Prosecutor [1973] 1 M.L.J. 156 at 157 (F.C.) [Lim Chow Keng]; Tee Teng Heng
v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 602 at para. 22 (H.C.).
16 (S.S.) (Cap. 21, 1936 Rev. Ed.) [1936 CPC].
17 (S.S.) No. 21 of 1900.
18 (S.S.) No. 10 of 1910.
19 Note also s. 423(1)(b)(3) of the contemporary Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act No. V of
1898, India), which stated expressly that in an appeal from a conviction the court could not enhance the
sentence.
20 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance 1933 (S.S.) (No. 36 of 1933), s. 37 [emphasis added].
21 See “Objects and Reasons” of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill 1933 in the Straits Settle-
ments Government Gazette (29 September 1933) No. 1867, 1835 at 1880; (6 October 1933) No. 1907, 1985
at 2030. The Bill was passed with minimal amendments on 4 December 1933 (see Straits Settlements Gov-
ernment Gazette (29 December 1933) No. 2480, 2829; “Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill” in
the Supplement to the Straits Settlements Government Gazette (17 November 1933) No. 111, 178; “Crim-
inal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill” in the Supplement to the Straits Settlements Government Gazette
(5 January 1934) No. 1, 203).
22 No. 22 of 1926, Federated Malay States.
23 2012 CPC, supra note 1, s. 390(1)(c).
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By expanding the scope of the provision to include appeals in the Court of Appeal,
it is not difficult to surmise that the draftsman intended for s. 390(1)(c) of the 2012
CPC to have the same effect in respect of such appeals that s. 256(c) of the 1985
CPC had in relation to appeals in the High Court. So what effect did s. 256(c) have?
What powers did it confer upon the High Court? In Navaseelan, Tay J. said that this
section, when read with other statutory provisions conferring revisionary jurisdiction
upon the High Court, gave that court the revisionary power to enhance a sentence
even if the Prosecution had failed to appeal.24 This power is not available to the Court
of Appeal in respect of appeals from the High Court, for two reasons. The Court
of Appeal does not possess revisionary jurisdiction under the relevant legislation,25
and revisionary jurisdiction can only be exercised over an inferior court, which the
High Court is not.26
It is in fact considered that s. 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC confers on the appellate
court a straightforward power under its appellate jurisdiction to increase a sen-
tence even where the Prosecution has not appealed. After all, s. 390(1)(c) has to
be viewed in harmonious tandem with its neighbouring provision, s. 390(1)(b)(ii),
which plainly allows the court to enhance a sentence where the only appeal filed
is one against conviction. It would seem highly incongruous to permit the court to
increase the punishment only where the convicted person had appealed his convic-
tion but not his sentence. No convincing reason exists why the power to enhance
sentences should not extend to both types of appeals. In my opinion, therefore,
the position is rightly stated in Oloofsen v. Public Prosecutor,27 Lim Chow Keng,28
and Shafruddin bin Selengka v. Public Prosecutor.29 Notably, in several appeals
brought by the convicted person against their sentence, the High Court also seem-
ingly viewed the power to enhance sentences as one falling within its appellate
jurisdiction.30
Section 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC is derived from s. 256(c) of the 1985 CPC,
which is in turn traceable to s. 310(c) of the 1936 CPC. The story behind the intro-
duction of s. 310(c) is not uninteresting. In 1950 an appeal against sentence could
be taken only in respect of an error of law or fact. Thus an amendment was passed
to allow an appeal to be filed on the sole ground that the sentence was excessive
or inadequate, as the case might be.31 All this is gathered from a statement made
by the Acting Attorney-General of the Colony of Singapore when he introduced the
24 Supra note 8 at paras. 30-32.
25 Mok Swee Kok v. Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 134 at para. 24 (C.A.); Ng Chye Huey v. Public
Prosecutor [2007] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 106 at paras. 63, 64 (C.A.) [Ng Chye Huey].
26 Ng Chye Huey, ibid. at paras. 40-53.
27 (1964) 30 M.L.J. 305 at 305 (H.C.).
28 Supra note 15 at 157.
29 [1994] 3 M.L.J. 750 at 754 (H.C.) [Shafruddin].
30 Samnasivam s/o Sharma v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 514 at para. 11 (H.C.); Narindar Singh
s/o Malagar Singh v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 318 at para. 60 (H.C.); Heng Jong Cheng
v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 769 at para. 1 (H.C.); Choo Pheng Soon v. Public Prosecutor
[2001] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 115 at para. 43 (H.C.).
31 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, 1950 (No. 30 of 1950, Sing.), s. 2. Section
4 of this amendment ordinance then inserted into s. 310 of the 1936 CPC, supra note 16, the words “in
an appeal as to sentence, reduce or enhance the sentence, or alter the nature of the sentence”.
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amendment Bill in 1950:32
The Privy Council in a recent appeal, Mohinder Singh and another vs. The King,
has held that under the Criminal Procedure Code in its present form no appeal
lies against any sentence of a Criminal District Court or a Police Court except
in respect of some error in law or in fact. This ruling applies as fully to appeals
by convicted persons as to appeals by the Crown. The purpose of this Bill is to
legalise appeals as to sentence where the only ground of appeal is that the sentence
is either excessive or inadequate.
While there is no citation for the case quoted in the passage, it is probably a reference
to Mohindar Singh v. R.33 The following table compares the reason given by the
Acting Attorney-General for the amendment with amended s. 310(c) itself.
The Acting Attorney-General’s reason
for introducing the amendment
Amended s. 310(c) of the 1936
Criminal Procedure Code
The purpose of this Bill is to legalise
appeals as to sentence where the only
ground of appeal is that the sentence is
either excessive or inadequate.
[emphasis added]
At the hearing of the appeal, the Court
may… in an appeal as to sentence,
reduce or enhance the sentence…
[emphasis added]
This might seem to suggest that, under s. 310(c), the court could reduce the sentence
in an appeal where it was argued that the sentence was excessive, or enhance the
sentence in an appeal where it was argued that the sentence was inadequate. On
one reading, the 1950 amendment was not intended to permit the court to reduce
or enhance a sentence in the converse situations, that is, to allow reduction of the
sentence where it was argued that the sentence was inadequate, and enhancement of
the sentence where it was argued that the sentence was excessive. If this is correct,
it would also mean that the court cannot increase a sentence if the Prosecution fails
to appeal the sentence on the ground that it was inadequate.
However, the 1950 statement has not been the only official comment on the
provision. In 2010, the Minister for Law made the following remark when moving
the Criminal Procedure Code Bill:34
Ms Lim has suggested that when an accused appeals against his sentence, without
any cross-appeal by the prosecution, his sentence should not be enhanced by
the Courts. On any appeal against sentence, the Appellate Court is required to
consider the totality of the circumstances and must have the discretion to enhance
the sentence, if it considers that the sentence is inadequate.
32 See “Objects and Reasons” of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance, 1950 in
the Supplement to the Colony of Singapore Government Gazette (18 April 1950) No. S 124/1950, 479 at
480.
33 [1950] A.C. 345 (P.C.), on appeal from the High Court of the Colony of Singapore.
34 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 87, col. 571 (19 May 2010) (Mr. K. Shanmugam) [emphasis added].
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The criminal justice system must take cognisance not only of the accused
person, but also the interests of the victim and the protection of the public. We
should therefore not fetter the Court’s duty to decide the punishment that fits the
crime.
The Minister does not refer expressly to s. 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC, but it is
reasonably clear that he was alluding to that provision. Whatever the position that
obtained when it was introduced in 1950, there is now little doubt that an appellate
court is empowered under s. 390(1)(c) to increase the punishment in any appeal on
sentence coming before it. This will include a case where only the convicted person
(and not the Prosecution) has brought an appeal.
Now, if the s. 390(1)(c) power to enhance sentences resides under the court’s
appellate jurisdiction, then that power is equally available in appeals both before
the High Court and the Court of Appeal. There is no need to invoke a revisionary
power of any sort, provided that the appeal on sentence has been properly brought
(whether by the convicted person or by the Prosecution). This is important. It means
that in a case where only the convicted person has appealed against sentence, the
usual standard of review should apply, that is, appellate interference will be justified
if the judge below erred in respect of the proper factual basis for sentence or failed to
appreciate the materials before him, or if the sentence was wrong in principle and/or
law or manifestly inadequate.35 There will be no need to establish a serious injustice
before intervention is warranted, as would be required where the High Court was
exercising its power of revision to increase a sentence.36
To briefly conclude on the first and second scenarios. If only the convicted person
has filed an appeal and it is against his conviction, the court is empowered under
its appellate jurisdiction to enhance the sentence, pursuant to s. 390(1)(b)(ii). If
his appeal is against his sentence, the court also has the power under its appellate
jurisdiction to increase the punishment, but this time pursuant to s. 390(1)(c). The
third scenario of an appeal against both conviction and sentence is an a fortiori
case. It needs to be appreciated that the operative provision will differ depending
on whether the convicted person’s appeal is brought against his conviction or his
sentence. The point may seem slightly pedantic but it was overlooked, for example,
in Moganaruban s/o Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor37 and Cheong Siat Fong
v. Public Prosecutor,38 where the court said that it was increasing the sentences
under the forerunner to s. 390(1)(c) despite the appeals having been brought against
conviction, not sentence. Finally, and on a practical level, there is much to be said
for the court hearing the appeal to allow the convicted person the utmost latitude
reasonably available to state why he should not be subject to a higher sentence, for
the decision sua sponte to enhance a sentence will almost invariably inject an element
of surprise.39
35 Public Prosecutor v. Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 601 at para. 82
(C.A.) [Mohammed Liton].
36 Navaseelan, supra note 8 at para. 32.
37 [2005] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 121 (H.C.).
38 [2005] SGHC 176.
39 See also Lim Chow Keng, supra note 15 at 157.
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IV. Some Closing Thoughts
Having discussed the existence of an appellate power to enhance sentences even in
cases where the Prosecution has not appealed, two concluding points are made. I
had mentioned at the beginning the right of appeal belonging to a convicted person.
In view of the appellate court’s power to increase the punishment, however, a con-
victed person should consider carefully before launching an attack against the trial
judge’s decision. The bringing of “misconceived”40 and “audacious”41 appeals by
convicted persons has not been countenanced by senior judges, who have responded
by increasing the sentences in appropriate cases. Normatively speaking, there is
ample justification for this stance, stemming from the desire to further the interests
at stake—such as the protection of the public, the effective use of judicial time,
and the integrity of the sentencing process in our criminal justice system. The
courts themselves will no doubt be astute to the signals sent out by any practice
of enhancing sentences. Only the truly deserving cases should attract the imposi-
tion of an increased sentence, and care should be taken not to do anything which
would unduly inhibit prospective appellants from appealing. Of course, there is no
necessary inconsistency between the two. The balance was caught by Yong Pung
How C.J.:42
The enhancement of the sentences, while also aimed at discouraging frivolous
appeals, is certainly not to deter legitimate appeals. Appeal is, after all, a matter
of legal right. But we do not want accused persons to appeal with the vain hope
of a reduced sentence when it is clear that they should be put away for sufficient
periods of time.
It is thought that a useful distinction can be drawn (at least in cases where only
the Defence has appealed) between what is necessary and what is sufficient for the
discretionary exercise of the power to enhance sentences. In that which is necessary,
one refers to the usual standard of review of the trial judge’s exercise of sentencing
discretion, that is, the court must be satisfied either that the judge erred in respect of the
proper factual basis for the sentence or failed to appreciate the materials before him,
or that the sentence was wrong in principle and/or law or manifestly inadequate.43
But is this sufficient? Perhaps two other important questions ought to bear on the
court’s mind when deliberating whether to increase a sentence. Is it fair in all the
circumstances to impose an enhanced sentence even though the Prosecution has not
appealed? Will enhancing the sentence in this case unduly discourage prospective
appellants in others from exercising their right of appeal?44 The answers will have to
40 Choo Pit Hong Peter v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 834 at para. 87 (H.C.) [Choo Pit Hong
Peter].
41 Wong Hoi Len v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 S.L.R.(R.) 115 at para. 52 (H.C.) [Wong Hoi Len]. See also
Thong Sing Hock v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 47 at para. 62.
42
“In Conversation with Chief Justice Yong Pung How” Annual Report 1999—Leading Justice @
Subordinate Courts at 26, online: State Courts Singapore <https://app.statecourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/
File/AR_1999/conversation3.pdf>.
43 Mohammed Liton, supra note 35 at para. 82.
44 See Wong Hoi Len, supra note 41 at para. 21; Shafruddin, supra note 29 at 754.
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depend on the facts of each case. Judicial restraint may be called for.45 For instance,
an increased sentence may well be justified where the convicted person had ignored
legal advice not to proceed with a patently unmeritorious appeal, but an appellant who
is unrepresented might attract greater leniency from the court. Or, to take another
example, where the offence committed is newly created or has not previously been
the matter of prosecution, the court may recognise the lack of precedential guidance
and therefore stay its hand and not enhance the punishment. At the other extreme,
where the sentence imposed at trial is patently wrong in law then there will be no
room to say that it should not be increased to the proper level on appeal.46 There are
obviously many more circumstances which will affect the equation. Sentencing is
a highly facultative exercise. But in a case where the only appeal has been brought
by the convicted person the interests of the public and the individual become even
more clearly defined.
The second point relates to the fact that often enough it is only the convicted
person who has appealed against the trial judge’s decision. The Prosecution has the
discretion not to bring an appeal against the sentence imposed, and provided this
discretion is exercised constitutionally and not arbitrarily it is unchallengeable.47
In such a scenario, what position might the Prosecution take if the appellate court
is of the opinion that the sentence should be enhanced? Well, at the very least the
Prosecution ought to assist the court at the hearing, and if it thinks the sentence passed
below is adequate it will no doubt submit arguments to the court on why the sentence
should not be increased. What poses greater difficulty is where there are extraneous
reasons for the Prosecution not having appealed, for example: if there was informal
plea bargaining behind the scenes, if the sentence imposed below had fallen within
the Prosecution’s own internal acceptable benchmarks, if the convicted person had
whistle-blown on his accomplices or revealed the identity of a criminal mastermind,
or if it was simply a better allocation of Prosecutorial resources elsewhere. None of
this may ever be made known to the appellate court.48 But by the same token it cannot
be remotely said that these matters, which are completely internal to the Prosecution,
ought to have any impact (unless statutorily provided for) on the appropriate sentence
to be passed, once the case is properly before the appellate court in the form of an
appeal by the convicted person against his conviction or his sentence. The court
is thenceforth duty-bound to exercise its discretion to select the punishment which
it thinks appropriate, having regard to established judicial principles,49 as well as
possibly the considerations mentioned in the previous paragraph. No deference
should thus ordinarily be afforded to the Prosecution’s hesitation in bringing an
appeal. What was said in Liaw Kwai Wah v. Public Prosecutor, that the Prosecution’s
45 See Choo Pit Hong Peter, supra note 40 at para. 87; Fricker Oliver v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 1 S.L.R. 84
at para. 40 (H.C.); Ang Jeanette v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 S.L.R. 1 at para. 73 (H.C.); Lee Chiang
Theng v. Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 S.L.R. 751 at para. 39 (H.C.).
46 Khirul Ihsan bin Hussain v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 3 M.L.J. 397 (H.C.).
47 Huang Meizhe v. Attorney-General [2011] 2 S.L.R. 1149 at para. 27 (H.C.); Ramalingam Ravinthran
v. Attorney-General [2012] 2 S.L.R. 49 at para. 17 (C.A.); Sabapathee v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[2014] UKPC 19 at para. 21.
48 See e.g., the puzzlement expressed in Tan Sri Abdul Rahim bin Mohd Noor v. Public Prosecutor [2001]
3 M.L.J. 1 at 4, 5 (C.A.).
49 Mohammad Faizal bin Sabtu v. Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 S.L.R. 947 at para. 45 (H.C.).
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right to appeal a sentence for manifest inadequacy cannot be usurped by a judge,50 is
undoubtedly correct but not quite relevant. That was uttered in relation to the judicial
power of revision, which is primarily to be used only to right serious injustices and not
to increase sentences in general fashion. Where an appeal has been properly brought
by the convicted person, however, there can be no accusation that the court’s exercise
of the powers under ss. 390(1)(b)(ii) and 390(1)(c) of the 2012 CPC to enhance a
sentence is a trespass into the Prosecutorial bailiwick.51
50 [1987] 2 M.L.J. 69 at 71 (S.C.).
51 I therefore respectfully disagree with the sentiment expressed by Murphy J. in Neal v. R. (1982) 149
C.L.R. 305 at 311 (H.C.A.) and by Laskin J.A. (as he then was) in R. v. Willis [1969] 1 O.R. 64 at 75
(C.A.). In my view there is no necessary incongruity in a case where the court takes it upon itself in an
appeal to increase a sentence even if the Prosecution does not consider the sentence inadequate. In fact,
as elaborated on earlier, sufficient justification probably exists for the enhancement of a sentence in this
way, if such enhancement is warranted on the facts of the case (see, in similar vein, HKSAR v. Lui Kin
Hong Jerry (No. 2) [2001] 2 H.K.C. 513 at 524-526).
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